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IMPLIED CONTRACTS AND CREATING A
CORPORATE TORT, ONE WAY STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT ARE STARTING TO FIGHT
PLANT CLOSINGS
J. BRADLEY RUSSELL*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Increases in capital mobility and the frenzy of corporate acquisitions have caused a restructuring of the American economy that
manifests itself through the closure of plants and other facilities.
Because of the devastating impact these closures have on communities, state and local governments are feeling increased pressure to
intervene. This article examines four lawsuits recently filed by state
and local go.vernments against corporations that have closed or plan
to close a plant within the jurisdiction of the particular governmental
unit. A brief initial discussion of the problem-merger mania and
increased capital mobility-and a short review of past efforts to
contain the problem provide the context for examination of these
lawsuits.
II.

THE PROBLEMS OF RESTRUCTURING

The last decade has seen increased restructuring of all facets of
the American economy. The results of this restructuring are rarely
felt by corporate shareholders, but rather are felt by the communities
where the plants and businesses are closed. The problems faced by
these communities and by the scores of displaced workers are self

* Director of Special Prosecutions for the West Virginia Attorney General's Office; B.S.,
1979, West Virginia University; M.B.A., 1980, West Virginia University; J.D., 1983, West Virginia
University. The author is counsel for the State of 'West Virginia and Governor Arch A. Moore, Jr.
in a plant closing case to be discussed, infra.
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evident.' One particular facet of restructuring, "merger mania," is
especially destructive to the economy.
Two decades of managerial energies devoted to sterile paper entrepreneurialism
and the merger game are, at the same time, two decades during which management
attention has been diverted from the critical task of investing in new plants, new
products, and new state-of-the art manufacturing techniques. Billions of dollars
spent on shuffling ownership shares are not spent on productivity-enhancing plant,
2
equipment, and research and development.

Since 1980, the annual number of corporate acquisitions has more
than doubled, and the value of the companies being acquired on

1. The following is an excerpt from one of many letters received by West Virginia Governor,
Arch A. Moore, Jr., regarding the plant closing and its impact.
I am writing in regards to the Anchor Hocking employees.
I am concerned about the middle aged people who worked there. The younger people
can and are most able, and most likely, to get rehired. The older people, over 55 years of
age, can get their pensions.
What about the middle people? People ranging in age, mostly 45 to 55. Most of them
started at the plant when they were 18 years old, and as far as occupation, they know
nothing else! Most of them have been there 30 to 35 years. Over the years a lot of them
have developed many medical problems. Some of which were brought on by their work.
Now with their age and medical history who is going to hire them?
I know several people, ladies and men, who are in this category.
I hope you really read this, because I want to tell you about one of them.
He has worked at the plant since he was 18 years old to date, he has been employed
at the plant 36 years!
He has hearing loss. One nerve in his ear is damaged so bad, it has affected his eye
sight. He has just started wearing glasses. He is a diabetic, taking 2 insulin shots a day.
He has worked the last 2 years with large sores on the bottom of his feet. (How, I do not
know.) His feet and legs are blue from loss of circulation and dead nerve. He gets nauseous
and vomits 3 or 4 times a day and has for the past 2 years.
In April he will be 54 years old. With his medical history who will hire him???
I think there should be some bargaining done for these people! I don't know what;
maybe total years worked plus age.
So where do these people stand? They can't get welfare, (no dependent children), they
worked all these years to gain a home, plus necessities to live. Most of them own a home
and a car or two. So they are not eligible.
it is a shame. You have to lose what you worked for your whole life in order to get
any help.
Now, when I tell you who the man I have mention is you will say I am prejudice.
I am!! He is my husband . . ..
2. Brock, Bigness is the Problem, Not the Solution, CHALLENoE, July-Aug. 1987, at 11, 14
(emphasis in original).
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an annual basis has increased five-fold. 3 During this same time pe-

riod, the amount of money spent on mergers and acquisitions has
far exceeded industry-financed research and development; and in

recent years the amount spent on mergers and acquisitions has even
4
exceeded net nonresidential private domestic investment.

Because corporate acquisitions are presumed to be in the best

interest of the shareholders and the economy, the interests of communities and employees have been subordinated. Only recently have
commentators started to challenge the presumption that acquisitions
3. Professor Brock, reports the following statistics:

Year

Number of
Acquisitions

Total Reported Value
($ in billions)

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986

1,565
2,326
2,295
2,345
3,064
3,165
4,022

33.06
66.96
60.39
52.25
125.23
139.13
190.00

Id. at 12 (citation omitted).
4. To prove this point, Professor Brock, offers the following table ($ in billions):

Year

M & A

Industry Financed
R &D

Net Nonresidential
Private Domestic
Investment

$ 44.3
82.6
53.8
73.1
122.2
179.8

$30.9
35.9
40.1
43.2
48.0
53.2

$ 88.9
98.6
65.5
45.8
92.0
117.2

Id. at 14 (citation omitted).
5. Generally speaking, the literature recognizes four theories of why acquisitions occur. Summary of Staff Study, Determinants of CorporateMerger Activity: A Review of the Literature, 73
FED. REs. BALL. 270 (1987). The first hypothesis concludes that "mergers and takeovers primarily
reflect efforts to wrest corporate control from inefficient entrenched management in order to realize
the full potential of a firm's assets." Id. A second hypothesis concludes that tax considerations, e.g.
increased depreciation through increasing the basis of assets, tax-loss carryovers, etc., form the basis
for corporate acquisitions. Id. at 270-71. A third theory "maintains that mergers are motivated by
the desire to limit competition and gain market power." Id. The final hypothesis suggests that mergers
and acquisitions are the result of market inefficiencies that leave the asset value of a corporation
undervalued, thus, a bargain purchase can occur. Id. All of these hypotheses reflect a belief that
acquisitions promote market efficiency and increase shareholder value.
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are good for the shareholders . 6 The costs of corporate acquisitions
to other segments of the economy are more frequently becoming

the focus of articles. 7 More importantly, the harms occasioned by
merger mania and the general restructuring of the economy8 are
becoming the focus of government intervention, primarily on the

state and local levels.
The experience of West Virginia with corporate acquisitions has
not been favorable. In August of 1987, West Virginia was faced

with a plant closing that was the direct result of a corporate acquisition. On July 1, 1987, the Newell Co. acquired the Anchor
Hocking Corporation. 9 Anchor Hocking Corporation is primarily

6. See Weiderbaum & Vogt, Takeovers and Stockholders, Winners and Losers, 29 CAiF.
MANAcE ENT REv. 157 (Summer 1987). This article suggests that contrary to the "prevailing folklore"
there are shareholder losers in the takeover game. The article also suggests some personal motives in
acquisitions: "in a market for corporate control where transactions costs are present, the management
of the acquiring firms can pursue acquisition strategies that satisfy their individual interests at the
expense of shareholders." Id. at 162.
7. There are numerous insightful articles which question the value of the current level of
corporate acquisition. See, e.g., Alexander, Is the United States Substituting a Speculative Economy
for a Productive One?, 20 J. EcoN. IssUEs 365, 374 (1986); Drucker, To End the Raiding Roulette
Game, AcRoss THE BoARD 30 (April 1986). Professor Alexander, in his article, focuses on: "the
decline of basic producing sectors of the economy, and the increasing diversion of financial resources,
capital equipment, and human talent into activities that do not produce goods or services designed
to raise the general standard of living, that do not improve the capacity of the economy to provide
such increases in the standard of living, but, rather, that amount to speculation." Alexander, supra,
at 365. Professor Alexander predicts dire peril for the American economy, and particularly its currency,
if the trend continues. Id. at 372-73. Professor Drucker criticizes the impact of the raiding roulette
game: "There is a great deal of discussion about whether hostile takeovers are good or bad for
shareholders. There can be absolutely no doubt, however, that they are exceedingly bad for the
economy." Drucker, supra, at 30. Professor Drucker predicts government intervention, through the
courts or otherwise, will restore a balance of the competing interests involved in takeovers. Id. at
38-39.
8. The general restructuring problem is often characterized as plant closings. Included within
plant closings is a subset of actions taken as a result of an acquisition or as a necessary step to keep
a company from becoming a target. In Raiding Roulette, Professor Drucker notes that merger mania
forces management to operate in the short term. "More and more of our businesses, large, mediumsize, and small, are being run, not for the best business results, but, for protection against the hostile
takeover." Id. at 30. The short term profitability focus often results in plant closings and transfer
of operation for only marginal profitability gains. The impact of plant closings, in even large sunbelt
states, is astounding. "During three years, 1980, 1981 and 1982, in California alone, a sunbelt state,
979 plant closings resulted in 105,171 lost jobs . . . ." Rhine, Business Closings and Their Effects
on Employees-Adaptation of the Tort of Wrongful Discharge, 8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 362, 364 (1986)
(citation omitted).
9. Newell Co., based in Freeport, Illinois, has an extensive history of corporate acquisitions.
In 1968 the Newell Co. acquired E. H. Tate Co. (Bulldog home hardware) and Dorfile Mfg.
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engaged in the manufacture of glassware. One of its facilities, plant
#90, is located in Clarksburg, West Virginia, and, at the time of
acquisition, employed 940 persons. On August 10, 1987, the Newell
Co. announced it would close this plant effective November 1, 1987.
In the weeks after this announcement, government leaders scrambled
to find alternatives. When discussions between the corporation and
the state yielded no alternatives, the state and Governor Arch A.
Moore, Jr. filed suit on September 23, 1987, in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia and, later,
on October 7, 1987, filed suit in the Circuit Court of Harrison
County. This latter lawsuit, similar lawsuits in other states, and the
causes of actions they assert will be discussed, infra.
III.

PAST RESPONSES OF GOVERNMENT

Currently in the United States there is a great effort being made
to limit merger mania and plant closings. Many states have enacted
plant closing legislation, which routinely requires advance notice of
10
the shut down and, in some instances, requires severance pay. The
Co. (shelving systems). In 1971 the Boyle Needle Co. (art needlework) was acquired. In 1972 Newell
Co. went public. 1973 marked the acquisitions of the EZ Paint Corp. (paint sundries) and Jordan
Industries (home hardware). Newell took a brief rest and in 1978 continued its acquisition strategy
by taking over Dixon Red Devil, Canada (paint sundries), the Edgecraft Corp. (shelving systems),
and Baker Brush Co. (paint sundries). In 1979 the Newell Co. became a NYSE company. In 1980
it acquired the Brearley Co. (Counselor bathroom scales). In 1981 the company swallowed two other
entities, Jiffy Enterprises (home hardware) and Judd Drapery Hardware, a division of the Stanley
Works. In 1982 the acquisition strategy continued to burn with the acquisition of BernzOmatic Corp.
(propane/oxygen hand torches) and the Handi-Man Corp. (home hardware). 1983 the Mirro Corp.
(cookware and bakeware) was added to the Newell group of companies. 1984 saw the acquisition of
Foley-ASC, Inc. (cookware and bakeware) and Lilo-Rail of Canada (drapery hardware). In 1985 the
Newell Company acquired Ignitor Products International, Inc. (hand torches) and Androck, Inc.,
Canada (paint sundries and home hardware). A 39% interest in American Tool (vise-grip locking
plier) was also accomplished in 1985. The William E. Wright Co. (ribbons, lace and trimming) was
acquired in 1987 along with the Anchor Hocking Corporation. NEwELL Co., 1986 ANNUAL REPORT

13 (1987);

NEWELL

Co., 1987

FIRsT QUARTER REPORT AND INVESTOR FACT SHEET

2-3 (1987).

10. Various legislative proposals have been advanced to soften the impact of closings on
the workers and communities left behind, but few have been enacted. In 1982 there were
16 such proposals pending in various states. All of them required advance notification to
employees, unions, and representatives of the affected communities by employers proposing
to terminate, relocate, or drastically reduce operations. Notice requirements ranged from
60 days to two years ...
Actual passage of closing legislation has, however, been limited to only four states: Maine,
New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin.
Rhine, Business Closings and Their Effect on Employees-The Need for New Remedies, 35 LAB. L.J.
268, 272 (May 1984) (footnotes omitted).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1988

5

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 4 [1988], Art. 8
1254

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

second area of government intervention in problems of restructuring
is the attempt to restrict mergers and acquisitions. "Historically,
federal takeover policy has been the narrow aim of protecting the
shareholders of target companies. However, many states' takeover
policies, while seeking to protect their residents as investors, also
seek to protect a much broader array of interests.""
In 1982 the United States Supreme Court dealt a blow to the
ability of states to regulate takeovers when it decided Edgar v. Mite
Corp.12 In that case the Court struck down an Illinois statute that
attempted to regulate, and effectively deter, corporate acquisitions. 3
Legislation passed subsequent to the Mite decision has been generally
unsuccessful. 4 Recently, however, the Supreme Court upheld an Indiana acquisition statue against both a Williams Act and a commerce
clause challenge. 15 Thus, at the time of this writing, new life has
been given to state takeover regulations. Its impact has yet to be
seen. Both plant legislation and takeover regulations deal with the
broad picture of restructuring without addressing specific instances.
While general treatment of the subject may yield the best results,
recently governments, including West Virginia, have begun to challenge, through the courts, specific plant closings.
IV.

LITIGATION BY UNIONS TO STOP PLANT CLOSINGS

Starting in the late 1970's and continuing into the 1980's, judicial
challenges to plant closings were made by employee groups and
unions. Generally speaking, these challenges were unsuccessful. The
most famous case, United Steelworkers Local 1330 v. United States
Steel Corporation6 (hereafter Youngstown Steel) involved the closure of two steel mills by U. S. Steel and the attempts by the union
11. Note, The Constitutionalityof State Business CombinationLegislation: New York's Section
912, 8 CARDozo L. REv. 1025, 1027 (1987) (footnotes omitted).
12. Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
13. Id.
14. See, Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986); Dynamics Corp.
v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987); Ichan v. Blunt, 612 F.
Supp. 1400 (W.D. Mo. 1986).
15. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
16. United Steelworkers Local 1330 v. United States Steel Corp., 492 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ohio),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980) [hereinafter Youngstown Steel].
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and the community to stop the closure. 17 The Court of Appeals for

the Sixth Circuit recognized the problem and clarified the articulated
cause of action:
This appeal represents a cry for help from steelworkers and townspeople in
the City of Youngstown, Ohio who are distressed by the prospective impact upon
their lives and their city of the closing of two large steel mills.
The primary issue in this case is a claim on the part of the steel worker
plaintiffs that United States Steel made proposals to the plaintiffs and/or the
membership of the plaintiffs to the general effect that if the workers at the two
steel plants concerned put forth their best efforts in terms of productivity and
thereby rendered the two plants 'profitable,' the plants would then not be closed.
It is clear that this claimed contract does not rest upon any formal written document, either authorized or signed by the parties to this law suit."

The representations by the company and the detrimental reliance on

them by the employees were well documented. 19 The "cry for help"
went unheeded as both the district court and Sixth Circuit concluded
that the condition precedent to continued operation, the profitability
of the plant, 20 had never been met.
Another cause of action asserted in Youngstown Steel derived
from some comments the district judge made at a pretrial hearing.

This cause of action was called the "community property claim"
and, generally, suggested that the community, because of its long
relationship with the plants and the company, had acquired a prop-

erty right in the plants. 21 Neither the district court nor the Sixth
17. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted a preliminary
injunction keeping the plants open and then held a prompt trial, days later, at which point the
injunction was dissolved. Youngstown Steel, 492 F. Supp. at 2.
18. Youngstown Steel, 631 F.2d at 1265, 1267.
19. Id. at 1271-77; Youngstown Steel, 492 F. Supp. at 5-11.
20. Youngstown Steel, 492 F. Supp. at 11; 631 F.2d at 1279.
21. United States District Judge Thomas Lambros articulated this theory:
It would seem to me that when we take a look at the whole body of American law and
the principles we attempt to come out with-and although a legislature has not pronounced
any laws with respect to such a property right, that is not to suggest that there will not
be a need for such a law in the future dealing with similar situations-it seems to me that
a property right has arisen from this lengthy, long-established relationship between United
States Steel, the steel industry as an institution, the community in Youngstown, the people
in Mahoning County and the Mahoning Valley in having given and devoted their lives to
this industry. Perhaps not a property right to the extent that can be remedied by compelling
U.S. Steel to remain in Youngstown. But I think the law can recognize the property right
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Circuit felt that recognizing this asserted cause of action was within
the role of the courts.22

One success by unions in the litigation of plant closings is the
enforcement of arbitration clauses where a legitimate dispute as to
a contractual provision regarding the plant closing arises. In Lever

Brothers Company v. InternationalChemical Worker's Local 217,23

the court affirmed a lower court injunction that prevented Lever
Brothers from transferring a soap production operation from Baltimore, Maryland, to Hammond, Indiana, until arbitration over a
"due consideration-full information" contractual prerequisite was
met. The Fourth Circuit adopted a "frustration of arbitration" standard and affirmed the injunction, inasmuch as arbitration would
have been meaningless and frustrated had the plant transfer been
allowed to take place.2A

The crux of the problem of restructuring is determining what
duty a corporation has to the community it vacates and the employees it terminates. The intervention of governmental units to legally challenge plant closings implicates both considerations.
V.

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FIGHTS BACK

There are four suits currently pending in which governmental
units challenge a plant closing.2 5 All four suits base action on inducements granted by the government to the corporations.
to the extent that U.S. Steel cannot leave the Mahoning Valley and the Youngstown area
in a state of waste, that it cannot completely abandon its obligation to that community,
because certain vested rights have arisen out of this long relationship and institution.
Youngstown Steel, 631 F.2d at 1280 (emphasis in original).
Needless to say the United Steel Workers then moved to amend their complaint to reflect this
new "cause of action."
22. In rejecting this "community property" cause of action, the Sixth Circuit stated: "In the
view of this court, formulation of public policy on the great issues involved in plant closings and
removals is clearly the responsibility of the legislatures of the states or of the Congress of the United
States." Id. at 1282.
23. Lever Bros. v. International Chem. Workers Local 217, 554 F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1976).
24. Id. at 122. See also, Lowe Lodge No. 1226, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists &Aerospace Workers
v. PanoramicCorp., 668 F.2d 276, 283 (7th Cir. 1981), where that court adopted the Lever Brothers
standard and affirmed the enjoining of the sale of an industrial facility pending resolution of a
grievance over whether Panoramic was required to condition the transaction on the purchaser recognizing the local union under the collective bargaining agreement.
25. City of Yonkers v. Otis Elevator Co., No. 83 Civ. 5944 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal docketed, No.
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City of Yonkers v. Otis Elevator Company26

The first of these suits was filed by the City of Yonkers against
the Otis Elevator Company and its parent, United Technologies Cor-

poration. In 1971 Otis Elevator considered moving from Yonkers,
New York, to a site in New Jersey due to limitations on its ability
to expand and modernize its Yonkers facility because of the nonexistence of available land contiguous to its plant. Otis approached
city officials regarding this problem and eventually reached an agreement whereby the City of Yonkers, through its appropriate agencies,

exercised its urban renewal powers to condemn the existing houses
and business in the vicinity of the Otis plant. The city then razed
the existing structures and gave the land to Otis for a token price.
In return, Otis agreed to expand and modernize its production and
remain in Yonkers.
The City of Yonkers spent in excess of $16,000,000 in fulfilling

its end of the deal and transferred the land to Otis for $554,000.27

87-7092 (2d Cir. 1987); City of Norwood v. General Motors Corp., No. A8705920 (C.P. Hamilton
Co., Ohio); In Re: Indenture of Trust Dated as of March 1, 1982, re: City of Duluth $10,000,000
Indus. Dev. Revenue Bonds, Series 1982-1 (The Triangle Corp. Project), Court File No. 158 (6th
Dist. Minn.); West Virginia v. Anchor Hocking Corp., No. 87-C-759-1 (Cir. Ct., Harrison Co., W.
Va.).
26. City of Yonkers, No. 87-7092.
27. The complaint filed in the action alleges, in pertinent part:
13. Prior to 1972, Otis considered moving its operations from Yonkers because Otis's physical plant in Yonkers was antiquated and becoming inefficient.
14. Otis informed Yonkers and the Development Agency that in order to be competitive
Otis would require more land than it owned in Yonkers in order to construct new and
efficient facilities to carry out its future elevator manufacturing operations.
15. Otis said it could not expand its facilities within Yonkers because acquisition of land
would be too complex, and because it could not acquire the public thoroughfares within
Yonkers required to put together a proper land package.
16. On March 7, 1972, based upon the representations by Otis and in an attempt to retain
Otis in Yonkers and, in addition, to retain employment as well as to provide opportunities
for training and further employment of residents of Yonkers and surrounding areas through
development of the industrial site, and to eliminate some substandard and deteriorating
areas, Yonkers and the Development Agency proposed, in writing, to assume financial,
administrative and governmental responsibilities to obtain, transfer, and make available to
Otis land in Yonkers of sufficient size, condition, and continuity to its existing holdings
to enable Otis to construct the new facilities Otis said it required in order to modernize
and make more efficient and competitive its operations in Yonkers.
17. The proposal by Yonkers and the Development Agency was contingent upon Otis's
continuing its operations in Yonkers.
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Between 1974 and 1976 Otis spent approximately $14,000,000 to

18. The proposal by Yonkers and the Development Agency was extended with the understanding that if accepted by Otis, Yonkers and the Development Agency would expect that
Otis would remain for a period of time to provide Yonkers and the Development Agency
a reasonable opportunity to realize and recover its investments and expenses on behalf of
the general public and for the better welfare and good of the community.
19. On June 5, 1972, Development Agency (then known as Yonkers Urban Renewal
Agency),Yonkers, and Otis executed a "Letter of Intent" whereby Otis agreed, in acceptance
of the March 7, 1972 proposal, inter alia, to remain in Yonkers; accept the Urban Renewal
Plan dated May 31, 1972; accept the land package involved; improve and expand its facilities; and continue its opportunities for employment and job training.
20. Development Agency and Yonkers agreed by the "Letter of Intent" to convey or transfer
substantially the same land offered to Otis in the March 7, 1972 proposal at prices set forth
in the "Letter of Intent", regardless of the value of the public thoroughfares owned by
Yonkers or of the actual cost incurred by Yonkers and the Development Agency in obtaining,
clearing, and preparing the land.
21. By execution of the June 5, 1972 "Letter of Intent" and a September 13, 1974 contract
for sale of land, and by subsequent acceptance of the land package and construction of
facilities in Yonkers, Otis accepted the March 7, 1972 proposal and agreed to continue its
operations in Yonkers for a reasonable period of time, and to remain for a period of time
to provide Yonkers and the Development Agency a reasonable opportunity to realize and
recover their investments and expenses on behalf of the general public and for the better
welfare and good of the community.
Implied Contract
22. The acceptance by Otis in 1974 of the land package from Yonkers and the Development
Agency carried with it an implied acceptance by Otis of the condition precedent to the offer
and sale of the land, to wit: Otis would continue its operations in Yonkers for a reasonable
period of time, and that Otis would remain for a period of time to provide Yonkers and
the Development Agency a reasonable opportunity to realize and recover their investments
and expenses on behalf of the general public and for the better welfare and good of the
community.
Quasi Contract
23. Acceptance by Otis of the land at a price far less than the cost or value to Yonkers
and the Development Agency, with the knowledge by Otis that Yonkers and Development
Agency were willing to accept a price for the land at much less than its full cost or value,
in an effort to retain Otis's operations in Yonkers for a reasonable period of time, provides
Yonkers and the Development Agency a contract by law to obtain fair value of difference
between the amount paid by Otis and the cost and value to Yonkers and the Development
Agency, as well as the public in general, when Otis prematurely removed its operations
from Yonkers as hereinafter set forth.
Breach of Contract
24. The period of time for performance by Otis and United of these obligations due to
Yonkers and the Development Agency is for a reasonable time to be set by law, and is
alleged to be at least sixty years.
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expand and modernize its facility in Yonkers. 28 In 1983 Otis closed
its Yonkers plant and the city filed suit to recover the $16,000,000
it spent to condemn and raze the properties that it had provided to
Otis. In addition, it sought $5,000,000 in punitive damages.

The Yonkers case presents a governmental unit seeking to recover
the value of the inducement granted to the corporation. The central
issue is how long Otis was obligated to remain in Yonkers by re-

ceiving the inducement from the city. No time was expressly provided by any agreement; thus, Yonkers relies on general contract

law for the principal that the law will supply a "reasonable time."
Yonkers further argues that the New York Court of Appeals decision
in Haines v. City of New York 9 is controlling: "[W]here the parties
have not clearly expressed the duration of a contract, the court will
imply that they intended the performance to run for a reasonable
time." 30 The length of that "reasonable" time" is a jury question.
31
The Yonkers cause of action would seem to be meritorious.
The voluntary acceptance of inducements by a corporation in return

for its agreement, express or implied, to operate a plant or business

(and thereby provide economic benefits to the community) should
create a right of action to satisfy the governmental unit's quid pro

quo. Interestingly, Yonkers seeks to be made whole for its expen25. All terms and conditions of the "Letter of Intent" were fulfilled by Yonkers and the
Development Agency; title to the property was transferred and conveyed to Otis in 1974.
26. Otis completed expansion and construction of its facilities in Yonkers in 1976 and started
operations in the expanded facilities that same year.
27. The value of the public thoroughfares and the cost to Yonkers and the Development
Agency of meeting the requirements of the proposal, "Letter of Intent", and agreements
with Otis exceeded $16,500,000.
28. The property was sold to Otis for the net sum of $554,000 pursuant to the terms of
the "Letter of Intent" and the contract for sale of land.
Complaint at 4-8, City of Yonkers, No. 83 Civ. 5944.
28. Brief of Otis Elevator at 1, City of Yonkers, No. 87-7092.
29. Haines v. City of New York, 41 N.Y.2d 769, 364 N.E.2d 820, 396N.Y.S.2d 155, (1977).
30. Id. at 772, 364 N.E.2d at 822, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 158.
31. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted Otis Elevator's motion for summary judgment on December 11, 1986. The district court applied the statue
of frauds to the "agreement", i.e. because the "reasonable time" was greater than one year, the
statute of frauds prohibited proof by oral testimony. City of Yonkers v. Otis Elevator Co., 649 F.
Supp. 716, 725-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). Alternatively, the district court held that the time Otis was to
remain in Yonkers was terminable at will. Id. at 732. The City of Yonkers appealed the ruling to
the Second Circuit and the case has been submitted for decision for nearly a year.
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ditures as opposed to seeking the value of the benefit it was to

receive as its part of the bargain, i.e. the financial impact of the
Otis plant on the community for the "reasonable" period of time.

That measure of damages, which would clearly be greater than the
value of the inducement, may have been rendered negligible by the
sale of the plant by Otis to the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey and the subsequent investment and provision of jobs by
32
the Port Authority at the Yonkers facility.
B.

33
City of Norwood, Ohio v. General Motors Corporation

The largest employer in Norwood, Ohio, was General Motors
(hereinafter "G.M."). In August 1987, as part of an ongoing modernization effort, G.M. closed its Norwood facility and transferred
the full operation to its Van Nuys, California, plant. Several thousand workers were idled by this closing, and the City of Norwood
filed suit. Norwood's complaint alleges, generally, that G.M. has
been unfair and irresponsible in its treatment of Norwood in light
of the devastating consequences of this closing. Norwood filed suit
34
under several different theories.

32. Brief of Otis Elevator at 24, City of Yonkers, No. 87-7092.
33. City of Norwood, No. A 8705920.
34. The complaint provides in pertinent part:
7. The Defendant, General Motors Corporation, first established an assembly plant in
the City of Norwood in 1923. The size of the plant grew continuously, until the plant
became the City of Norwood's largest employer, employing in excess of four thousand two
hundred (4,200) individuals. The city of Norwood encouraged the growth of the General
Motors' Norwood plant, and the General Motors Corporation became a vital and integral
part of Norwood's community.
8. The City of Norwood encouraged the growth of the Norwood GM plant by granting
numerous concessions to the Defendant, General Motors Corporation, including, but not
limited to, the building of an underpass at Forest Avenue in 1982, at a cost to the Plaintiff
of Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand ($750,000.00) Dollars, to accommodate trains bringing
rail cars into the Norwood GM plant, upon the assurances and representations of the Defendant, General Motors Corporation, that the Defendant was spending Two Hundred Million ($200,000,000.00) Dollars to modernize the Norwood GM plant. Further, the Plaintiff
vacated several streets in and around the GM plant, at great cost to the Plaintiff, to permit
the Defendant, General Motors' Norwood property to be contiguous. Other concessions
included assisting General Motors in the purchase or attempted purchase of property adjacent to the Norwood Plant, assisting with traffic problems and, in general, doing anything
that General Motors requested.
9. In November of 1986, the Defendant, General Motors Corporation, announced,
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A breach of contract theory relates that Norwood provided several concessions and inducements to G.M. and consequently, G.M.

without warning, that the Norwood GM plant would close in 1988; all operations would
be moved at that time to Van Nuys, California. Then, again without prior notice, in March
of 1987, General Motors announced that the Norwood GM plant would close instead in
August of 1987.
10. The closing of the Norwood GM plant has had and will have a catastrophic economic effect upon the City of Norwood; the Defendant, General Motors Corporation, is
the City's largest employer and taxpayer, and the City derives nearly one-third of its tax
revenues from the Defendant.
11. The City of Norwood, in the ordinary course of its business, prepares its budgets
five years in advance, and bases its hiring decisions, wage and benefit packages, purchasing
decisions, public works decisions and other matters of a similar nature, on projected revenues. The City of Norwood had thus originally anticipated total tax revenues for the
years 1986 to 1991 as follows:
1989 : $8,888,707
1986 : $9,278,455
1990 : $9,185,231
1987 : $8,372,269
1991 : $9,494,302
1988 : $8,472,356
In fight of the closing of the Norwood GM plant, the City of Norwood now anticipates
a gross reduction of revenue, for the years 1986 to 1991, in the amount of Fifteen Million
Six Hundred Eighty Eight Thousand Seven Hundred Eighty Six ($15,688,786.00) dollars.
12. To begin adjusting for the sudden, and unexpected, termination of operations at
the Norwood GM plant, the City of Norwood has instituted a number of immediate, emergency cost saving measures, including:
a.) A ten percent (10%) reduction in salary for all administrative personnel;
b.) Termination of approximately ten percent (10%) of the City's work force, with
the termination of an additional seven percent (7%) through the process of attrition;
c.) Elimination of the City's Waste Collection Department;
d.) A ten percent (10%) reduction in the budget of the Police Department;
e.) A ten percent (10%) reduction in the budget of the Fire Department;
f.) Reduction in senior citizens' social services;
g.) Elimination of most liability insurance coverage;
h.) A thirty percent (30%) increase in water rates; and
i) A decrease, due to attrition, of the City's police and fire departments.
Despite the foregoing measures, the City of Norwood will still suffer a substantial
deficit, which will further affect adversely the quality of life of the citizens of the City of
Norwood.
13. The Defendant, General Motors Corporation, has also informed the city of Norwood that at the time of the GM plant closing, the Defendant, General Motors Corporation,
will remove its fire and plant protection personnel from its property, and that the City of
Norwood must assume the full responsibility for fire and police protection for General
Motors' Norwood property. Thus, the City of Norwood must offer additional services,
previously unrequired, to General Motors at a time when the Plaintiff's police and fire
forces have been seriously depleted, due to the acts of General Motors. The cost of the
additional services which Norwood will be required to furnish to General Motors will exceed
Four Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($450,000.00) per year.
14. At the time of the announcement by General Motors that its Norwood plant would
close, officials of the City of Norwood sought to deter General Motors' decision by offering
additional concessions to the General Motors, but to no avail. Thereafter, in an effort to
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was to retain a viable manufacturing facility in Norwood.35 Addi-

mitigate the economic impact upon the City of Norwood, caused by the closing of the
Norwood GM plant, the City of Norwood formed a citizen's Task Force to study the City's
financial crisis and to propose a plan for relief to the Defendant. A plan was submitted
to the General Motors in April, 1987 followed by a June 26, 1987 meeting with General
Motors' representatives. General Motors proved uncooperative and uninterested, and took
the position the General Motors would do nothing for the City. General Motors' attitude
was one of callous indifference towards the community which had supported General Motors
for the past sixty four (64) years.
15. The overwhelming size of the General Motors' Norwood plant, in relation to all
other businesses in the City of Norwood, conferred upon the General Motors Corporation
a virtual monopoly of power in its dealings with the City of Norwood, such dealings including General Motors' requests for concessions. Other American automakers, such as the
Chrysler Corporation, having comparable relationships with cities in which major plants
are located, have recognized their position of power and at the time of plant closing have
offered generous transitional aid to the affected communitiesand have paid all obligations
due the communities. The Defendant, General Motors Corporation, has refused to act in
a like manner.
16. Due to the economic crisis facing the City of Norwood caused by the acts and
omissions of the Defendant, General Motors Corporation, and due to its refusal to make
a good faith effort to resolve the differences which have arisen between the Plaintiff and
the General Motors, the Plaintiff, City of Norwood, has no option but to pursue its legal
rights against the Defendant, for the purpose of protecting and assuring the well being of
the citizens of the City of Norwood.
Complaint and Jury Demand at 2-7, City of Norwood, No. A-8705920.
35. In "Plaintiffs response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss" Norwood outlines some of its
inducements or concessions:
The following examples are given as an illustration of the kinds of concessions which
were given by the citizens of Norwood over the years. This list is by no means all inclusive,
but is indicative of the kind of power which General Motors was able to wield in the City
of Norwood.
1. In 1981 the City of Norwood passed an ordinance requiring employers in the City
to withhold an earnings tax. General Motors chose to ignore this requirement. Norwood
sought to enforce this ordinance against General Motors but General Motors informed the
City that it would by no means comply with the ordinance. Norwood had no choice but
to give in to General Motors.
2. In 1982, at the request and urging of General Motors, Norwood built an underpass
on Forest Avenue. It is true, as asserted by General Motors, that others used and continue
to use this underpass. However, it was erected at the behest of the defendant and on the
assurances that two hundred million dollars would be spent to modernize the Norwood
Assembly plant. Without such assurances the underpass would not have been built. Norwood's share of the cost of the underpass was seven-hundred and fifty thousand ($750,000.00)
dollars. Matching funds from governmental agencies would not have been available without
cooperation by the City of Norwood. The principal reason that the underpass was built
was to accommodate rail traffic to and from the Norwood Assembly Plant.
3. Over the years, Norwood has vacated several streets around the Assembly Plant in
order to accommodate GM's wishes that its property run contiguously. General Motors
indicated to Norwood that if the property was joined contiguously the plant would run
more efficiently thus benefitting both Norwood and General Motors. General Motors can
hardly complain that Norwood relied on such assurances. Norwood quite naturally assumed
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tionally Norwood alleges promissory estoppel and nuisance theories.
For a period of time, Norwood received a temporary restraining
order under the nuisance theory. The allegation was that the Norwood plant contained dangerous and flammable chemicals that had
withdrawal of
been stored there during its 60 year life, and G.M.'s
6
nuisance.
a
fire protection and guards constituted
In its prayer for relief, Norwood asks for $56,000,000 for loss
of tax revenues and commerce, $9,000,000 for increased costs of
police and fire protection, $750,000 for the construction of an overpass, $2,500,000 to rededicate previously vacated streets, and
$250,000,000 in punitive damages.
The Norwood suit seeks to create a common-law standard requiring corporations to deal fairly with communities they vacate.
Norwood relies heavily on policy arguments contained in law review
articles37 and upon the articulation of U.S. District Judge Thomas
Labros in the Youngstown Steel case discussed supra. G.M. responds
that the Sixth Circuit expressly rejected that particular cause of action."8
that by granting such requests GM would remain a going concern in Norwood.
4. 80% of Norwood is designated as an Enterprise Zone. This zone includes the entire
General Motors Assembly Plant property. The existence of the Enterprise Zone gave GM
an astronomical tax advantage. The designation of the property as an Enterprise Zone would
not have been possible without the acquiesence [sic] of the City of Norwood.
5. Norwood was instrumental in implementing expansion plans for the Assembly Plant;
Norwood assisted General Motors in acquiring property adjacent to the existing grounds.
In particular, the City was instrumental in the acquisition of the Globe-Warnke property.
This property was a substantial acquisition for General Motors and Norwood assisted in
this purchase on the implicit understanding that it was insuring the economic future of the
City.
6. In compliance with the desires of General Motors, the City of Norwood refrained
from actively soliciting for the location of other large [sic] in Norwood thus severely restricting the potential tax base of Norwood. The result is that when GM pulled out the
city was economically devastated.
Plaintiff's Response to Defendants Motion to Dismiss at 4-6, City of Norwood, No. A-8705920.
36. The temporary restraining order was granted on August 7, 1987, modified on August 10,
1987, and vacated by an undated agreed order sometime in late August or early September, 1987,
apparently as a result of the lack of factual basis for the allegation that dangerous and hazardous
chemicals were stored on site, or a lack of factual basis that there was some violation of state or
federal environmental laws.
37. See, e.g., Rhine, Business Closings and Their Effect on Employees - The Need for New
Remedies 35 LABOR L.J. 268 (1984).
38. Motions to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment were filed by General Motors in November
1987 and were briefed and submitted to the court in late December. No ruling has yet issued.
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C. In Re: Indenture of Trust:39 Duluth, Minnesota and the
Diamond Tool Company
This case began with the takeover of Diamond Tool and Horseshoe Company of Duluth, Minnesota, by the Triangle Corporation
in the early 1980's. At the time of the acquisition, Triangle operated
another tool manufacturer in Orangeburg, South Carolina, under
the aegis of another wholly-owned subsidiary, Utica Tool Company,
Inc. In October of 1981, Triangle approached the City of Duluth
for assistance in financing the takeover and with a proposal to modernize and expand the manufacturing plant located in Duluth. On
March 1, 1982, the City of Duluth, Triangle, Utica, and Diamond
entered into a loan agreement whereby the city issued $10,000,000
in Industrial Development Revenue Bonds and loaned that amount
to the corporations for the project. In addition, an Indenture of
Trust was entered between the city and the First Bank, N.A. of
Duluth. Norwest Bank Minneapolis, N.A.40 issued a letter of credit
to the Trustee to secure repayment of the principal and some of the
interest of the Industrial Development Revenue Bonds. The corporations executed a Mortgage, Fixture Financing Statement, Assignment of Leases and Rents, and a Security Agreement relating
to the Duluth plant. A Second Mortgage and similar security documents were also executed for the Orangeburg, South Carolina, facility of Utica Tool. The project proceeded as anticipated until March,
1987. 41 At that time, the corporation announced major relocations
of warehouse and shipping functions, and the transfer of some manufacturing from the Duluth plant to the South Carolina plant. Thecorporations made this decision based upon a labor cost advantage
and more flexible work rules at the Orangeburg facility. In December, 1987, the corporation announced the transfer of almost all operations from Duluth to Orangeburg. Predictably, a dispute arose

39. In Re: Indenture of Trust, Court File No. 158.

40. At the time of the transaction Norwest was known as the Northwestern National Bank of
Minneapolis.
41. The City also obtained an Urban Development Action Grant ("UDAG") from the U.S.

Department of Housing and Urban Development in the amount of $750,000 to assist in the modernization of the plant. Due to a downturn in the economy, the modernization plans were modified
and an amendment to the agreement was executed by the parties to reflect this event.
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between the city and the corporations as to whether the corporations
were in violation of the 1982 contract, agreements, and security documents; accordingly, the Trustee commenced an action in state court
to construe the documents and ascertain if a violation has in fact
occurred.

42

42. The petition filed in the state court alleges in pertinent part:
7. In October, 1981, Triangle and its wholly owned subsidiary Diamond, proposed to
acquire all of the outstanding capital stock and assets of Diamond Tool and Horseshoe
Co., a Minnesota corporation, and to expand, re-equip and modernize the existing manufacturing facility located in West Duluth, and applied to the City for help to finance such
project through the City's issuance of $10,000,000 of Industrial Development Revenue Bonds.
Triangle, Diamond and Utica (collectively, the "Company") and the City entered into a
Loan Agreement (the "Loan Agreement") dated as of March 1, 1982, a copy of which is
appended hereto as Attachment B and incorporated by reference. Pursuant to the Loan
Agreement, the City agreed to loan to the Company the proceeds of its $10,000,000 Industrial Development Revenue Bonds, Series 1982-1 (The Triangle Corporation Project)
dated March 1, 1982 (the "Bonds"). In connection with the issuance of the Bonds, the
City and Trustee entered into the Indenture. Northwestern National Bank of Minneapolis
(now known as Norwest Bank Minneapolis, National Association) ("Norwest") issued its
Letter of Credit in favor of the Trustee to secure repayment of the principal and a portion
of the interest on the Bonds. The obligations of the Company were secured by (1) a Mortgage, Fixture Financing Statement, Assignment of Leases and Rents and Security Agreement
dated March 1, 1982, was granted from Triangle and Diamond to the Trustee and Norwest
(the "Diamond Mortgage"), a copy of which is appended hereto as Attachment C and
incorporated herein by reference, and (2) a Second Mortgage, Fixture Financing Statement,
assignment of Leases and Rents and Security Agreement dated March 1, 1982, from Triangle
and Utica to the Trustee and Norwest (the "Utica Mortgage"), a copy of which is appended
hereto as Attachment D and incorporated herein by reference.
8. In addition to the loan pursuant to the Loan Agreement, the City obtained an
Urban Development Action Grant for such project and the City loaned the Proceeds of
such grant to the Company pursuant to an Action Grant Loan Agreement dated as of
Marchl, 1982, by and among the City, Triangle, Diamond and Utica (the "Action Grant
Loan Agreement"), a copy of which is appended hereto as Attachment E and incorporated
herein by reference, and such loan was secured by a Mortgage, Fixture Financing Statement
and Security Agreement dated March 1, 1982, from the Triangle and Diamond to the City
(the "City Mortgage").
9. The Loan Agreement contains, in part, the following representations of the Company:
(8) Subject to the other provisions of this Agreement and the Diamond Mortgage and
City Mortgage, it is presently intended and reasonably expected that the equipment to be
purchased from the proceeds of the Bonds will be permanently located and exclusively used
on the Project Premises and that the Company will operate the Project on the Project
Premises throughout the Term of this Agreement in the normal conduct of the Company's
business.
Loan Agreement, Section 2.02 (8).
(11) . . . nor will the Bond proceeds be used in any other fashion which would
violate provisions of the [Muicipal Industrial Development] Act.
Loan Agreement, Section 2.02 (11).
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On February 17, 1988, the district court set the case for hearing
on March 30, 1988, and issued a restraining order prohibiting the

10. Project is defined in Section 1.01 of the Loan Agreement as . . . including all
Project Equipment, as [it] may at any time exist. 'Project Equipment' is defined in Section
1.01 of the Loan Agreement as:
Project Equipment: any and all (i) fixtures of tangible personal property now or
hereafter attached or affixed to the Project Premises, (ii) other tangible personal property
now or hereafter located within or used in connection with the Project Premises or the
Facility acquired, in whole or part, from Bond proceeds (which items are generally described in Exhibit B attached hereto), and (iii) any additions to, replacement of and substitutions for any of the foregoing as may be permitted or required by the Diamond
Mortgage or this Agreement; but excluding (i) property installed pursuant to Section 33 of the Diamond Mortgage (if proper notice is given to the Trustee and the Bank, as
Mortgages, pursuant to the provisions of said Section) and (ii) any other property released
or taken by Condemnation as authorized or contemplated by the Diamond Mortgate.
"Project Premises" is also defined in Section 1.01 of the Loan Agreement and describes
the real estate located in Duluth, Minnesota, on which the Company operates its manufacturing facilities.
11. Section 3.4 of the Diamond Mortgage contains the following provision governing
removal of Project Equipment:
Section 3-4. Removal of Project Equipment. The Mortgagor [Triangle and Diamond] will not . . .
without the prior written consent of the Mortgagee [the Trustee and Norwest], remove
or permit the removal or sell or otherwise surrender its right to possession of any item
of Project Equipment unless (1) the Mortgagor first determines that such item has become
inadequate, obsolete, worn out, unsuitable, undesirable or unnecessary for the operation
of the Mortgaged Property and that such disposition will not otherwise materially impair
the operating unity or structural unity of the Mortgaged Property, and (2) if the estimated
fair market value of such item exceeds $500,000, the Mortgagor (1) either (a) substitutes
for such item, machinery or equipment of substantially equivalent utility to that replaced,
or (b) pays to the Trustee for deposit in the Bond Fund (as defined in the Indenture) a
sum equal to the fair market value of the item to be replaced, and (2) notifies the Mortgagee of the action the Mortgagor intends to take with respect to such item of Project
Equipment. . . This Mortgage shall immediately attach to and constitute a lien or security
interest against any substituted item without further act of deed of the Mortgagor.
12. The Certificate of Company states in relevant part:
With respect to certain 'capital expenditure' limitations affecting the tax exempt status of
the Bonds, we further certify . . . [t]he proceeds of the Bonds are to be used with respect
to facilities located wholly within the boundaries of the City [of Duluth] ( 9(0, page 13).
13. Since the acquisition of the Project, certain additional equipment has been installed
at the Diamond facility in West Duluth and certain Project Equipment has been removed
from the facility. A substantial portion of the Project Equipment which was removed from
the Diamond facility has been transferred to Utica's Orangeburg, South Carolina, plant for
use in the manufacture and sale of hand tools. Appended as Attachment F are unverified
schedules prepared by Triangle of the Project Equipment added and removed from the
Diamond facility.
14. Representatives of the city have asserted that removal of Project Equipment from
the Diamond facility and the transfer of that Project Equipment to the Utica facility constitutes an event of default under both the Diamond Mortgage and the Loan Agreement
and constitutes a violation of Minnesota Statutes Chapter 474 (now codified as part of,-
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removal of any "Project Equipment" from the Duluth plant until
resolution of the case. Owing in large part to the disqualification
of the corporation's law firm in the matter, the hearing was con43
tinued for an additional thirty (30) days.
The Duluth suit sets up the classic confrontation between the
right of a corporation to transfer operations to a more profitable
location (due to decreased labor costs, etc.) and the obligations that
arise as a result of economic inducements received by corporations
from local government. Duluth has an excellent suit as a result of
an express contractual provision restricting transfer of "project
equipment," 44 a Minnesota statutory requirement that restricts such
publicly financed corporate activities to Minnesota locales ,'45 and the

Minnesota Statutes Chapter 460). Triangle is not in default on loan repayments under the
Loan Agreement.
15. The Company has not obtained consent from the Trustee for removal of any item
of Project Equipment from the Diamond facility.
16. The Company, through its attorney, stated that Triangle has made the determinations required by Section 3-4 of the Diamond Mortgage with respect to each item of
Project Equipment removed from the Diamond facility.
17. The City alleges that the Company's removal of Project Equipment from the Diamond facility is in violation of Minnesota Statutes Section 474.03, Subd. 2 (now codified
in Minnesota Statutes Section 469.155, Subd. 2), which only authorizes the City to finance
the acquisition of 'capital equipment to be located permanently or used exclusively on a
designated site . . .' in the city of Duluth.
18. The Company denies that Minnesota Statutes Section 474.03, Subd. 2, applies to
the Project.
19. Section 8-1 (6) of the Indenture states that 'if an Event of Default as defined in
the Loan Agreement or Mortgage [the Diamond Mortgage and the Utica Mortgage] has
occurred and is continuing', that such event shall constitute an Event of Default under the
Indenture.
20. Section 9-16 (1) of the Indenture authorizes the Trustee to proceed in accordance
with the provisions of Minnesota Statutes, Section 501.33 through 501.38, as amended, if:
(D) There is a disagreement between any of the parties to the Indenture or any other
related document as to whether a proposed action may be taken or is required to be taken;
21. Both the City and Triangle have requested that the Petitioner, as Trustee, seek
the instructions of this Court to resolve the disputed assertion of the existence of events
of default under the Diamond Mortgage and Loan Agreement, and by virtue of crossdefault provisions, the Indenture itself.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Court and prays for an Order
of this Court...
Petition for Constitution of Indenture of Trust and Instructions at 2-7, In Re: Indenture of Trust,
Court File No. 158.
43. Telephone interview with Niki Newman, counsel for the City of Duluth (April 6, 1988).
44. See supra Note 42 at
9-12.
45. At the time of the issuance of the Bonds, the Minnesota Municipal Industrial Development

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1988

19

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 4 [1988], Art. 8
1268

WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 90

proverbial "smoking gun." Apparently, the corporations decided in
1983 to close Duluth and transfer to more cost-advantageous South
Carolina and went to work to find a way around its contractual
4 6
arrangements with Duluth.

Act authorized:
"Any Municipality . . . shall have the power to:
(1) acquire, construct, and hold any lands, buildings, easements, water and air rights,
improvements to lands and building, and capital equipment to be locatedpermanently or
used exclusively on a designatedsite and solid waste disposal and pollution control equipment, and alternative energy equipment and inventory, regardless of where located, which
are deemed necessary in connection with the project to be situated within the state, whether
wholly or partially within or without the municipality of redevelopment agency, and construct, reconstruct, improve, better, and extend the project;
(2) issue revenue bonds, in anticipation of the collection of revenues of the project, to
finance, in whole or in part, the cost of the acquisition, construction, reconstruction,
improvement, betterment or extension thereof .. ;
MwN. STAT. § 474.03 (1982) (emphasis added).
In 1984 the act was amended and now reads:
Any municipality or redevelopment agency has the powers set forth in the section.
It may issue revenue bonds, in anticipation of the collection of revenues of a project
to be situated within the state, to finance, in whole or in part, the cost of the acquisition,
construction, reconstruction, improvement, betterment, or extension thereof.
MINN. STAT. § 469.155(1) & (3) (emphasis added).
The City argues that these statutory provisions restrict the mobility of the property which underlines the loans in question.
46. The City of Duluth, in its memorandum of law submitted to the state district court, quotes
documents obtained through discovery to expose this particular scenario:
Within a year of acquiring the Diamond Plant the Company began formulating a detailed
plan to phase out the plant. Exhibit S (Doc. No. A02714-787). This plan, entitled 'Project
Alpha,' was prepared in June 1983. It proposed a complete shutdown of manufacturing at
the Diamond Plant over three years. Under such plan, by January 1, 1986, 'Utica manufactures all products; Diamond Plant ceases operation and is closed.' Id.
Project Alpha was the subject of considerable discussion over the ensuing year. Exhibit
T (Doc. No. C1034); Exhibit U (Doc. No. A02709-1 1). The financing agreements connected
with the public subsidies received by the Company were viewed as a major impediment to
implementation because over $370,000 worth of equipment was required to be shipped from
Duluth to Orangeburg under the plan. Exhibit V (Doc. No. CH003-8); Exhibit W (Doc.
No. CH025-31). In a December 1, 1983 memo, the Company's president, H. Arthur Bellows,
stated that they must '[e]xamine "legal escape" from bond location restrictions - Define
method/cost of avoiding location restrictions (Duluth area only) inherent in Duluth $10
million Industrial Revenue Bonds. . .' Exhibit T (Doc. No. C1037). Similarly, a memo dated
March 15, 1984, from the Company's vice president, R. W. Metzger, notes that the additional equipment required for completion of the Alpha Project 'is currently restricted
from being moved' and suggests that the Company must 'develop [a] loophole in existing
financing agreement that will allow movement of capital [equipment] directly or on an equal
dollar trade basis, be it transfer, lease or loan.' Exhibit W (Doc. No. CH026-27).
City's Memorandum of Law at 6-7, In Re: Indenture of Trust, Court File No. 158.
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The reason any governmental unit grants an inducement to a
business is to keep that business operating in its jurisdiction. Duluth
notes:
The purpose of the Loan Agreement and related documents is unquestionably to
finance an economic development project to enhance employment and the tax
base of the City. Construing the above quoted provisions of the Loan Agreement
in light of this public purpose, it is clear that the City and Company intended
that the Company operate and maintain the Diamond Plant with increased pro7
duction capabilities and employment while the Bonds are outstanding.4

The City of Duluth is going to be denied its quid pro quo for having
granted the loan to the corporations as a result of the decision of
the corporations to transfer operations; and the corporations should
be held to have breached the contract for that reason.
D.

4
State of West Virginia v. Anchor Hocking Corporation1

In late 1978 the Brockway Glass Company announced its decision
to close its Clarksburg, West Virginia, glass plant. State leaders received a reprieve on the announced closing date and, with the help
of Brockway, began a search to find a purchaser. The ultimate purchaser was the Anchor Hocking Corporation, a leader in the field
of consumer glassware. On August 31, 1979, West Virginia, through
its Economic Development Authority (hereafter EDA), executed a
loan document and security agreements whereby $2,500,000 was provided to Anchor Hocking for a twenty (20) year term at an interest
rate of 1.126 percent. The 2.5 million dollars was part of a 14.5
million dollar economic development package provided to Anchor
49
Hocking to finance the purchase of this plant.
From 1979 through 1987 West Virginia provided additional economic incentives to the Anchor Hocking operation in Clarksburg

47. Id. at 14.
48. Anchor Hocking, No. 87-C-759-1.
49. Breakdown of Financing
$ 2.5 million from EDA
$ 2.0 million from the Clarksburg Association for Industrial Development
$ 10.0 million from proceeds of Industrial development revenue bonds sold by Harrison County
Loan Agreement among West Virginia Economic Development Authority, Association for Industrial
Development of Harrison County, and Anchor Hocking Corporation (Aug. 31, 1979).
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including $2,000,000 in tax incentives and $163,000 in job training
funds. In 1985, Anchor Hocking sought financing to modernize its
Clarksburg plant and went to the local community and the state.
By letter dated February 8, 1985, Anchor Hocking formally applied to the EDA for a $1,000,000 loan and made an express representation that:
As you are aware foreign competition and depressed business conditions have
caused Anchor Hockings current total employment at the facility to be reduced
to approximately 500 hourly and 75 salary employees. Within one year after the
completion of the improvements and additions to the facility, Anchor Hocking
anticipates that total employment at the facility will increase to approximately
750 hourly and 100 salary employees. Approximately 85%o of the new jobs will
be filled from the Clarksburg, West Virginia labor market with the remaining
15%b being filled by transferring employees from other Anchor Hocking locations
or recruiting them elsewhere. 0

On March 1, 1985, Anchor Hocking supplied estimates to the EDA
as to the impact of the plant on the local community. The projected
impact three years in the future (March 1, 1988) was estimated to
be 850 employees with an average annual wage of $20,800 constituting a $17,650,000 annual payroll coupled with $59,100,000 in annual sales. By letter dated April 23, 1985, the EDA approved the
loan and set forth the conditions, which provided: "(1) Conditional
Approval. This approval is based upon the continued validity and
accuracy of the facts set forth in the letters of the Company to
WVEDA dated February 8, 1985. . . .5 The conditions set forth
in the April 23, 1985, letter were accepted by the Anchor Hocking
Corporation. On August 31, 1986, the EDA entered into a loan
agreement whereby Anchor Hocking received $1,000,000 for a term
of ten (10) years at an interest rate of 4%.
On July 1, 1987, the Newell Co. acquired the Anchor Hocking
Corporation and on August 10, 1987, announced the Clarksburg
plant would close on November 1, 1987. On September 23, 1987,
the Governor of West Virginia filed suit in federal court and received
50. Letter
thority (Feb. 8,
51. Letter
ration (Apr. 23,

from Anchor Hocking Corporation to West Virginia Economic Development Au1985).
from West Virginia Economic Development Authority to Anchor Hocking Corpo1985).
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a temporary restraining order preventing the corporation from re-

moving any of the equipment from the Clarksburg plant.12 On October 7, 1987, a state court action was filed and a preliminary
injunction was issued restraining the equipment in the Clarksburg
plant.53

52. The federal court action was dismissed for want of federal jurisdiction on October 7, 1987,
at which time the parties travelled from the federal court house to the state court house to hold a
preliminary injunction hearing.
53. The complaint filed in the action provides in pertinent part:
COUNT I
5. On August 31, 1979, the State of West Virginia, through its Economic Development
Authority, entered into a loan agreement with defendant Anchor Hocking Company, ("Anchor") whereby the amount of Two Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($2,500,000.00)
was provided to Anchor. Such loan provided for a repayment term of twenty (20) years
at an interest rate of 1.126 percent, which was substantially below the prevailing market
rates at the time, and at all times subsequent.
6. The purpose of the loan was to assist Anchor in its acquisition of the Brockway Glass
Company, and more particularly, the facility described herein as Anchor Plant #90.
7. On April 3, 1986, the State of West Virginia, through its Economic Development Authority, entered into a loan agreement with Anchor, whereby the amount of One Million
Dollars ($1,000,000.00) was provided to Anchor. Such loan provided for a repayment term
of ten (10) years at an interest rate of 4 percent, which was substantially below the prevailing
market rates at the at the time, and at all times subsequent.
8. The consideration which the State of West Virginia was to receive for the entirety of
the loan agreements described in paragraphs 5 and 7, was the continued existence of a
manufacturing operation located in Harrison County, West Virginia, more particularly described as Anchor Plant #90. Such consideration was to continue unabated for the full term
of the contracts, i.e., until August 31, 1999 or April 3, 1996.
9. On August 10, 1987, the defendants announced plans to close Anchor Plant #90 effective
November 1, 1987. In the time period subsequent to such announcement the defendants
have commenced to dismantle the equipment and proceed with the closing.
10. The closing of Anchor Plant #90 will deprive the State of West Virginia of the benefits
which it was to receive under the contracts entered between its agencies and Anchor dated
April 3, 1986, and August 31, 1979.
11. The closing of such plant constitutes a breach of contract by which the State of West
Virginia and its citizens will be damaged. The damage cannot be measured in the award
of damages to reflect the true value of the cost of the money loaned to Anchor. The State
of West Virginia relied upon the good faith of the defendants to carry through with its
end of the agreements, and thereby the State allocated Three Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($3,500,000,.00) of a scarce pool of economic development resources and consequently the State has lost the opportunity of developing other industries in the Clarksburg
area between 1979 and 1987. The true measure of damages is the value of the consideration
the State will not receive as a result of the defendants' breach, i.e., the value of the continued
operation of Anchor Plant #90.
COUNT 1I
12. The State of West Virginia and its Governor, the Honorable Arch A. Moore, Jr., hereby
incorporate by reference paragraphs 1-11 as paragraph 12 of this complaint.
13. During the years 1979-1987, the State of West Virginia has extended economic incentives
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The state has taken the position that an implied provision of the
1979 and 1986 economic development loans was the continued operation of the plant in Clarksburg. In asserting its position the state
relies upon certain well established principles of commercial contract
litigation:
Under familiar rules a promise that a party will continue to remain in business
may be implied in fact as a part of an agreement for the rendition of services
to a business.
Such a promise to remain in business will be implied particularly where the
promisee had undertaken certain burdens or obligations in expectation of and
reliance upon the promisors continued activity54

The state argues that its provision of low interest loans, job training
monies, and tax incentives is an allocation of scarce resources and
to the defendants as an adjunct to its ongoing operation of Anchor Plant #90 and the
aforementioned contracts.
14. The State of West Virginia, by allocating part of a discrete pool of job training funds
for the defendants, has been damaged in the direct amount of One Hundred Sixty-two
Thousand Six Hundred Ninety-two Dollars ($162,692.00) which represents the costs of training 202 employees of the defendant corporations.
15. The State of West Virginia, by its Tax Department, has provided tax incentives to the
defendants for the period of time 1979 through 1987. Such incentives were provided as an
adjunct to defendants continued ongoing operation. The State has been directly damaged
by the amount of Two Million Dollars ($2,000,000.00), which represents the value of tax
incentives granted to the defendants during this time period.
16. The State of West Virginia's allocation of economic incentives to the defendants was
based upon the State's reliance upon the good faith of defendants to continue to operate
a long-term manufacturing facility in Harrison County, West Virginia, known as Anchor
Plant #90. Such long-term commitment to continued operation of Anchor Plant was the
consideration for which the State allocated this scarce pool of job training funds and for
which the State provided tax incentives.
17. The closing of Anchor Plant #90 represents a breach of an implied contract by the
defendants by which the State of West Virginia has been damaged directly in the amount
of One Hundred Sixty-two Thousand Six Hundred Ninety-two Dollars ($162, 692.00) for
job training and Two Million Dollars ($2,000,000.00) for tax incentives. The actual damage
to the State of West Virginia far exceeds the value of the services provided, as a discrete
pool of scarce resources were allocated to the defendants and the State thereby lost the
opportunity to utilize these resources in bringing about other economic development. The
measure of damages to the State of West Virginia is the loss of the value of the consideration
the State was to receive for its provision of training and tax incentives, i.e., the value of
continued operation of Anchor Plant #90.
Complaint, Anchor Hocking Corp., No. 87-C-759-1.
54. 407 E. 61st Garage, Inc. v. Savoy Fifth Ave. Corp., 23 N.Y.2d 275, 280, 244 N.E.2d 37,
40, 296 N.Y.S.2d 338, 342 (1968). See A. W. Fiur Co. v. Ataka & Co., 71 A.D.2d 370, 422 N.Y.S.2d
419 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 1979); Tele Communications Corp. v. Franchises Int'l, Inc., 332 F. Supp.
469 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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a lost opportunity cost that constitutes "burdens or obligations"
undertaken "in expectation of and reliance upon" Anchor Hocking's continued operation of a glass plant in Clarksburg.5 5 The state
further notes that it relied upon the express representation of Anchor
Hocking as to the impact on the community of the plant in the
years subsequent to the loanA6 The state bundles the express and
implied contractual arguments together with its detrimental reliance,
and the allocation of a scarce pool of economic resources and seeks,
in compensatory damages, $614,610,000. This amount reflects the
value of the quid pro quo the state would have received had the
corporation continued the operation of the facility for the full term
of the loan.
This portion of the West Virginia cause of action is somewhat
similar to the Yonkers case as it relies upon a promise to remain
in business, either express or implied, for a specified period of time.
The Duluth case likewise relies upon the implied term of continued
operation as a quid quo pro for economic inducements. Where West
Virginia departs from the Yonkers and Duluth cases is in the measure of damages. Yonkers and Duluth seek the value of the lost
inducement, i.e. $16 million and $10 million, whereas West Virginia,
arguing detrimental reliance and lost opportunity costs, seeks to receive the benefit of its bargain, i.e. the value of the continued operation of the plant.
Anchor Hocking, like the Triangle Corporation in the Duluth
litigation, argues business exigency for the closure and transfer decisions. Once again the classic confrontation is between allowing

55.
In 1979 and again in 1985, the State of West Virginia allocated part of a pool
of scarce resources to Anchor Hocking Corporation. In total, this pool consisted of
$3,500,000.00 in loans to Anchor Hocking at rates of 1.126 percent and 4 percent respectively. Additionally, during this time period, the State allocated a portion of a scarce pool
of job training funds to Anchor Hocking. All of these allocations of scarce resources were
predicated upon the good faith on Anchor Hocking to provide a continuing on-going facility
in Clarksburg. If Anchor Hocking had advised the State it would close the plant, gut it
and move out in- 1987, no such allocation would have occurred.
Brief of the State of West Virginia in Support of The Continuance of a Preliminary Injunction at
4, Anchor Hocking, No. 87-C-759-1.
56. Id. at 3-4. This included an impact in 1988-after the plant closed-of 850 employees and
a $17,650,000 annual payroll.
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corporations to have free rein on capital mobility versus obligations
created by the acceptance of inducements from state and local government.
West Virginia, Yonkers and Duluth are all attempting to establish
that a corporation, by accepting government inducements, has an
implied obligation to continue activity for a specified time period.
It is perhaps a jury question to determine the length of that time
period of continued operation. Norwood is attempting to establish
a standard of corporate behavior for plant closing situations. West
Virginia is also attempting to establish such a standard but upon a
different legal basis.
VI.

THE

DuTY oF GOOD

FAITH AND FAio DEALING

The duty of "good faith and fair dealing" is implicit in every
contract and has been adopted by virtually every court that has had
occasion to consider the subject.5 7 Perhaps the most quoted articulation of this duty comes from the New York Court of Appeals
in Kirk La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co.:58
[I]n every contract there is an implied covenant that neither party shall do anything
which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party
to receive the fruits of the contract, which means that in every contract there
exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.59

The fruits of the 1979 and 1986 EDA loans for West Virginia
were the jobs to be generated by the plant and its impact on the
community. The quidpro quo to governmental entities for the granting of economic incentives to corporations is the positive economic
impact that results from continued or increased employment. The
state has taken the position in Count V of its complaint that Anchor
Hocking, by virtue of its acceptance of economic incentives and the
contractual relationships vis-a-vis the low interest loans, has thereby
triggered a duty to exercise good faith and fair dealing to assure
57. A good general discussion of the duty of good faith and fair dealing can be found in
Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HAv. L.
Ray. 369 (1980).
58. Kirk La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 263 N.Y. 79, 188 N.E. 163 (1933).
59. Id. at 87, 188 N.E. at 167.
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that the state receives the benefit of its bargain, i.e. the value of
the continued operation of the plant. 60 This duty extends to making
a good faith decision on whether business exigency requires closure,
and it also requires the corporation to explore, in good faith, all
alternatives available to continue operation of the plant. In the event
of the futility of such acts then the corporation has a duty to make
a good faith effort to sell the plant to another identical or similar
manufacturer thereby providing the state with the benefit of the
bargain. The duty of good faith and fair dealing is a well established
legal principle and does not place an unreasonable burden upon a
business that would close a plant.
West Virginia, like many "rust belt" states, has experienced its
share of shutdowns and plant closings. The experience with Anchor
Hocking and its parent, the Newell Co., is the exception to corporate
dealing, rather than the rule. During the six day preliminary injunction hearing several examples of "good faith and fair dealing"
by companies closing plants in West Virginia were noted. The experience generally held out as exemplary related to a decision by
Volkswagen of America to close a stamping plant in South Charleston, West Virginia. Volkswagen provided the state an 18 month
advance notice of the closing; worked with the state in finding a
purchaser; agreed to leave specific equipment at the plant that was
needed by a subsidiary; loaned the subsequent purchaser $3,500,000;

60. Count V of the complaint states in pertinent part:
27. The duty of good faith and fair dealing requires a party to attempt to guarantee that
a contract is fulfilled and the consideration delivered. That such duty to seek fulfillment

of consideration exists even if business exigency requires termination of business.
28. The defendants thereby have a duty to exercise good faith and fair dealing to see that

Anchor Plant #90 continues to operate.
29. Such duty extends to providing for a sale of the facility and its equipment to other

investors.
30. The defendants have commenced a process of dismantling key equipment and destruction
of molds which will effectively gut Anchor Plant #90.
31. The defendants have at no time fairly dealt with the State in attempting to execute a
transfer of ownership to the State or to any other investor.

32. The State of West Virginia is damaged by this breach of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing. Mere monetary damages cannot compensate the State of West Virginia for
this violation, thus injunctive relief in the nature of specifically requiring this good faith
and fair dealing is appropriate.
Complaint at 6-7, Anchor Hocking, NO. 87-C-759-1.
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and guaranteed the $14,600,000 loan the state granted to the pur61
chaser.
62
Many examples of good and bad faith abound in the literature.

For every U.S. Steel that levels plants and leaves communities like
Youngstown high and dry63 there is a Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel that,
despite Chapter 11 bankruptcy, continues to pay $1,500,000 per year

to maintain the furnaces in its Monessen, Pennsylvania, plant so as
to keep the plant viable and attractive to a purchaser, and keep alive
the possibility of jobs returning to the community."
The West Virginia suit attempts to establish a "good faith and
fair dealing" standard of corporate conduct in plant closings by

61. Andrew A. Payne III, the financial strategist for the West Virginia Governor's Office of
Community and Industrial Development, outlined the Volkswagen effort in a February 15, 1988 memorandum:
Outlined below are the major items which Volkswagen of America has done to assist the
State of West Virginia's efforts in reopening their South Charleston stamping facility.
1. Agreed to leave 80-85% of their equipment in South Charleston while the State of
West Virginia attempted to find a purchaser for the equipment and the facility. They agreed
to do this even though some of their foreign subsidiaries had a need for the equipment.
2. Once we found a buyer for the equipment, Volkswagen agreed to guarantee $14.6
millon of the state's loan to the new company. This project would not have been able to
move forward if it were not for the guarantee.
3. Volkswagen agreed to lend the purchaser S3.5 million based on the same terms and
conditions of the state incentive package, which has a below market interest rate.
4. To assist the state in our efforts, Volkswagen announced the plant shutdown 18
months before they actually ceased production. This was of a tremendous benefit to the
state's efforts in locating another company to purchase the South Charleston stamping plant.
These are the major items which Volkswagen has provided to the Volkswagen/Park
Corporation project in reopening the plant. It goes without saying that they expended a
tremendous amount of time, money and personal effort in working with the State of West
Virginia, Park Corporation and the other companies which were interested in the facility.
Their cooperation had a particularly strong emphasis and individual attention from the
highest levels of Volkswagen of America and Volkswagen A.G., which is the parent company
located in West Germany.
Their efforts demonstrate to me that they are a corporation with a social conscience.
Memorandum from Andrew A. Payne III to Brad Russell (Feb. 15, 1988).
62. See, e.g., Wolf, The Closing of Firestone'sAlbany Plant: A Case Study, 37 LAB. L.J. 466
(1986).
63. See Youngstown Steel, 492 F. Supp. 1, and supra text accompanying notes 16-22. Additionally in a case in Illinois, a lawsuit was filed by the Attorney General of Illinois over the closure
of the U.S. Steel's South Works facility and inter aliaan attempt to exercise the condemnation power
of Illinois vis-a-vis this particular plant. U.S. Steel mooted the issue by razing the plant. See Note,
Eminent Domain: The Ability of a Community to Retain an Industry in the Face of an Attempted
Shutdown or Relocation, 12 Omao N.U.L. R-v. 231, 237-39 (1985).
64. Wheeling-Pitt keeps ovens on 'hot idle.' Charleston Gazette, Mar. 29, 1988, at SC, col. 1.
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applying "black letter" contract law to an area where it has not
heretofore been applied. Unlike Norwood, the West Virginia case
does not require the creation of a new cause of action, merely the

application of an existing cause of action in a new area.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The problems created by increased capital mobility and merger
mania are going to haunt society for many years. The devastating
impact of the resultant plant closings cry out for government intervention. State governments began to respond through regulating
mergers to slow the takeover frenzy and through plant closing legislation. These particular avenues have yet to be successful. Accordingly, state and local governments are now moving to litigate
plant closings under various theories. Despite the lack of success in
piecemeal litigation by unions, the state and local government efforts
seem to have a greater chance at success.
Can business take the money of state and local government and
run? Probably not. In 1985, the last year comprehensive statistics
were reported, state and local governments granted low interest loans
to businesses totalling approximately 24.6 billion dollars.6 5 The ac-

ceptance of these loans by businesses creates contractual obligations,
both express and implied. It is exceedingly clear that government

65. All fifty states have authorized the issuance of Industrial Development Bonds (IDBs) either
through state or local government. Additionally, many states have direct loan programs for business
from state pension funds or other sources. A state by state report of these inducements given to
business totaled in 1985: ($ in millions) (1) Alabama-S1,552; (2) Alaska-$176; (3) Arizona-S296; (4)
Arkansas-S112; (5) California-$250; (6) Colorado-$475; (7) Connecticut-S725; (8) Delaware-S848; (9)
Florida-S1,544; (10) Georgia-S859; (11) Hawaii-$90; (12) Idaho-$30; (13) Illinois-S250; (14) Indiana$750; (15) Iowa-$381; (16) Kansas-S313; (17) Kentucky-S427; (18) Louisiana-S273; (19) Maine-S57;
(20) Maryland-$710; (21) Massachusetts-S1,138; (22) Michigan-$787; (23) Minnesota-S1,096; (24) Mississippi -$564; (25) Missouri-S684; (26) Montana-S100; (27) Nebraska-S98; (28) Nevada-$27; (29) New
Hampshire-S218; (30) New Jersey-S1,068; (31) New Mexico-$53; (32) New York-S1,200; (33) North
Carolina-S388; (34) North Dakota-S138; (35) Ohio-$1,509; (36) Oklahoma-$86; (37) Oregon-$142; (38)
Pennsylvania-$ unable to be ascertained from the reported statistics, maximum allocation was $1,777;
(39) Puerto Rico-$114; (40) Rhode Island-S78; (41) South Carolina-$482; (42) South Dakota-S63; (43)
Tennessee-S608; (44) Texas-$1,414; (45) Utah-$ unable to be determined from reported statistics-maximum allowable for 1985 was $233; (46) Vermont-S119; (47) Virginia-$1,830; (48) Washington-$ unable
to be ascertained from statistics-1982-1986 activity $356; (49) West Virginia-S190; (50) Wisconsin-$474;
(51) Wyoming-$305. NAT'L ASS'N OF STATE DEv. AGENCiES, DIRECTORY OF INCENTIVES FOR BusnMESS

INv. & DEV. mr n

UNmIT

STATES (2d ed. 1986).
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does not grant the loans to receive the 1%7interest, but rather to
generate jobs and positive economic effects on communities. The
businesses that take the government inducements may have made
an implied contractual commitment to provide those jobs and the
positive impact on the communities for a period to be set by the
law and a jury.
The application of existing contract law to this new area is young
and untested. Whether any of these suits or the others that are sure
to be filed will succeed is yet to be seen. Some positive impact has
occurred and corporate raiders in particular and corporate leaders
in general are on notice that state and local governments will not
66
permit them to take the money and run.
It is likely that one or more courts will conclude that the acceptance of economic incentives from government does create an
implied duty to operate for a reasonable period of time. It is also
likely that one or more courts will permit a business to close a plant
because of business exigency, but then will require the corporation
to exercise good faith and fair dealing in trying to preserve the jobs
that were lost by the closure. These legal concepts are not radical,
and they should be adopted.

66. The Wall Street Journal on March 8, 1988, in a front page article detailed the "Battle of
Clarksburg" as it called the West Virginia Suit and noted an increasing hostility by government to
plant closings. It also reported that Wisconsin Governor Tommy Thompson had learned about the
West Virginia suit from West Virginia Governor Arch A. Moore, Jr., and thus when Chrysler Corporation announced the closure of the AMC Plant in Kenosha, Governor Thompson threatened to
file a similar implied contract and breach of good faith and fair dealing lawsuit. Chrysler Chairmen
Lee Iacocca responded by setting up a $20,OOO,000 fund to assist displaced workers and negotiations
on lawsuit avoidance between Chrysler and the State then commenced. White, Worker's Revenge,
Wall St. J., Mar. 8, 1988, at 1, col. 6.
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